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SELLING CROWDFUNDED EQUITY:
A NEW FRONTIER
JOAN MACLEOD HEMINWAY *
“Shares of stock in a corporation are alienable, which is to say that they
are freely transferrable and may be bought or sold at any time.” 1 The right
to sell affords equity holders a number of advantages. Two of these benefits
are particularly salient: the ability to protect the holder financially (allowing
the holder to guard against loss or more productively redeploy the invested
funds) 2 and the power to discipline or signal poor firm management
(including through the market for corporate control).3 Both of these
* Rick Rose Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee College of
Law. New York University School of Law, J.D. 1985; Brown University, A.B. 1982.
1. Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual Corporation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 764, 771
(2012).
2. See, e.g., Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 407, 414 (2006) [hereinafter Velasco, Fundamental] (“Shareholders . . . can
benefit economically by selling their shares at a profit.”); Julian Velasco, Taking
Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605, 632 (2007) [hereinafter Velasco,
Seriously] (“[S]elling shares is the shareholder's primary means of extracting value from her
investment.”).
3. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 110, 112 (1965) (positing the market for corporate control); see also, e.g., Kelli A.
Alces, Strategic Governance, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 1053, 1079-80 (2008) (“[A]ngry shareholders
can exit the firm, thereby making equity compensation for managers significantly less
valuable and making the firm more susceptible to takeover.”); Christine Sgarlata Chung,
Government Budgets as the Hunger Games: The Brutal Competition for State and Local
Government Resources Given Municipal Securities Debt, Pension and OBEP Obligations,
and Taxpayer Needs, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 663, 691 (2014) (“Corporate securityholders may also use exit discipline—i.e., selling ones securities—to express disapproval.”);
Carol Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing Shareholder Participation in
Corporate Governance: Too Little, but Not Too Late, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 379, 406 (1994)
(“[S]hareholders who are dissatisfied with management decisions can ‘vote with their feet’
by selling their shares and finding a different enterprise in which to invest.”); Harry G.
Hutchison, Choice, Progressive Values, and Corporate Law: A Reply to Greenfield, 35 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 437, 449 (2010) (“Investors who are dissatisfied with corporate performance can
exercise their exit option by selling their shares in the market. This move may depress the
share price of the firm and provide incentives for managers to improve performance or face
the prospect of a takeover.”); Troy A. Paredes, The Firm and the Nature of Control: Toward
a Theory of Takeover Law, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 103, 121 (2003) (“Shareholders have the
right to sell their shares when they disapprove of the way the board and the management
team are running the company or for any other reason.”); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 772-73
(“[T]he ability of investors to buy a controlling stake in a corporation on the secondary
market makes possible the ‘market for corporate control,’ which helps discipline managers
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elements of shareholder value, but especially the latter, typically are
available only in the public-company context because of the more certain
existence of a liquid secondary market. 4 Regardless, restrictions on the right
to sell necessarily limit these pecuniary and disciplinary capabilities,
impacting not only the financial and governance aspects of equity
ownership, but also the regulation of equity offerings and the healthy
development of securities markets.
Transfer restrictions come in a number of forms but can be easily
separated into two principal sources: (1) reasonable contractual, or contractlike, constraints authorized or contextually required under applicable law or
regulation (e.g., for the attainment or maintenance of certain desired entity
or transactional statuses—for instance, legal existence as a statutory close
corporation or S corporation or standing as a private placement of
securities) and (2) legal or regulatory restraints. 5 The former are
to put forth great effort on behalf of the corporation.”). At the extreme, unhappy selling
equity holders may sell control of the firm. See Paredes, supra (“[A]t least as a default
matter, shareholders have the right to sell their shares collectively so as to transfer control of
the company . . . .”); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 772 (“[A] disaggregated group of small
shareholders who collectively comprise a majority could jointly sell their shares (again at a
premium) in response to a tender offer.”).
4. Professor Paula Dalley explains:
The lack of a market for stock in closely held corporations also means that
stockholders in closely held corporations lack the protections provided by the
market for corporate control. In public companies, mismanagement results in a
decline in the stock price, which in turn provides opportunities for those who
think they would do a better job managing the company to purchase control.
The threat of a change in control thus disciplines existing management.
Paula J. Dalley, The Misguided Doctrine of Stockholder Fiduciary Duties, 33 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 175, 195 (2004) (footnote omitted); see also Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328
N.E.2d 505, 514 (Mass. 1975) (“In a large public corporation, the oppressed or dissident
minority stockholder could sell his stock in order to extricate some of his invested capital.
By definition, this market is not available for shares in the close corporation.”); Luca
Enriques, The Comparative Anatomy of Corporate Law, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 1011, 1015-16
(2004) (reviewing REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (2004)) (highlighting liquidity and managerial
discipline as features of the transferability of shares in public markets); Ian B. Lee,
Citizenship and the Corporation, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 129, 153 (2009) (“There is no
question but that public company shareholders' ability to exit the corporation lessens their
vulnerability. Indeed, the prevailing understanding of the market for corporate control is that
it is a potent, exit-based mechanism for the protection of the shareholders' interests.”).
5. See infra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (describing each type of transfer
restriction); see also Velasco, Fundamental, supra note 2, at 415 (describing share transfer
restrictions originating from shareholder fiduciary duties, federal securities law, contracts,
and state corporate law); James F. Ritter, Comment, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
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exemplified by charter, bylaw, or shareholder agreement restrictions
permitted under state corporate law and characteristically are used in
closely held or small firms. 6 The latter include restrictions imposed under
federal and state securities regulation that may apply more broadly. 7
This article briefly offers information and observations about federal
securities law transfer restrictions imposed on holders of equity securities
purchased in offerings that are exempt from federal registration under the
Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical NonDisclosure Act (the “CROWDFUND Act”), Title III of the Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act (commonly referred to as the “JOBS Act”).8 The
article first generally describes crowdfunding and the federal securities
regulation regime governing offerings conducted through equity
crowdfunding—most typically, the offer and sale of shares of common or
preferred stock in a corporation over the Internet—in a transaction exempt
from federal registration under the CROWDFUND Act and the related rules
adopted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). This
72 VA. L. REV. 851, 859 (1986) (noting the possibility of “valid contractual and legal
restrictions on transfer”).
6. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202 (West 2010); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.27
(AM. BAR. ASS’N 2010); Stephen J. Leacock, Share Transfer Restrictions in Close
Corporations as Mechanisms for Intelligible Corporate Outcomes, 3 FAULKNER L. REV. 109,
128 (2011) (“[S]tock transfer restrictions may . . . prevent inadvertent violation of federal
and state securities law that could lead to penalties and registration requirements. More
particularly, these restrictions can substantially reduce or eliminate unintentional violations
of the requirements for retention of subchapter S corporation tax status under the Internal
Revenue Code.” (footnote omitted)); Jonathan Macey & Maureen O'Hara, Stock Transfer
Restrictions and Issuer Choice in Trading Venues, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 587, 607 (2005)
(“Share transfer restrictions . . . are widely used by corporations and serve a number of valid
purposes.”).
7. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012) (making offers and sales of securities unlawful
without registration or compliance with an exemption from registration); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §
502 (1997) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2013) (permitting transfer of a partner’s financial
interest only, therefore prohibiting transfer of a partner’s governance interest); J. William
Hicks, The Concept of Transaction as a Restraint on Resale Limitations, 49 OHIO ST. L.J.
417, 419 (1988) (“Judicial and administrative interpretations of the Securities Act of 1933
require parties to certain securities transactions to use transfer restraints, establish the scope
and duration of the limitations, and make them enforceable irrespective of actual
knowledge.” (footnote omitted)); Daniel S. Kleinberger, The Closely Held Business Through
the Entity-Aggregate Prism, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 863 (2005) (describing the “pick
your partner” attribute of partnerships and other unincorporated entities and noting that, as a
result, transfer restrictions are statutory default rules in these entities).
8. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012)
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

192

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:189

regime includes restrictions on transferring securities acquired through
equity crowdfunding. The article then offers selected comments on (1)
ways in which the transfer restrictions imposed on stock acquired in equity
crowdfunding transactions may affect or relate to shareholder financial and
governance rights and (2) the regulatory and transactional environments in
which those shareholder rights exist and may be important. A brief
conclusion follows the description and commentary.
I. U.S. Federal Regulation of the Offer and Sale
of Equity Through Crowdfunding
Crowdfunding (as that term is used in this article) is a form of Internet
financing. 9 This manner of funding activities online, labeled as such, began
9. See Brian L. Frye, Solving Charity Failures, 93 OR. L. REV. 155, 178 (2014)
(“Crowdfunding is a way of using the Internet to ask the public for contributions to fund a
project.”); David Groshoff et. al., Crowdfunding 6.0: Does the SEC's Fintech Law Failure
Reveal the Agency's True Mission to Protect—Solely Accredited—Investors?, 9 OHIO ST.
ENTREP. BUS. L.J. 277, 280–81 (2015) (“Crowdfunding is an informal Internet-based method
of generating capital from the public at large, or the ‘crowd.’”); Joan MacLeod Heminway,
How Congress Killed Investment Crowdfunding: A Tale of Political Pressure, Hasty
Decisions, and Inexpert Judgments That Begs for a Happy Ending, 102 KY. L.J. 865, 877
(2014) (describing crowdfunding as “Internet offerings to an unlimited audience”)); Sharona
Hoffman, Citizen Science: The Law and Ethics of Public Access to Medical Big Data, 30
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1741, 1760 (2015) (“Crowdfunding is an Internet-based method of
fundraising by which one can solicit money from numerous donors, who usually contribute
small amounts.”); Roberta S. Karmel, Disclosure Reform-the Sec Is Riding Off in Two
Directions at Once, 71 BUS. LAW. 781, 820 (2016) (“Crowdfunding uses the Internet to raise
capital for a wide range of projects, typically seeking small contributions from a large
number of individuals.”); Alma Pekmezovic & Gordon Walker, The Global Significance of
Crowdfunding: Solving the SME Funding Problem and Democratizing Access to Capital, 7
WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 347, 356 (2016) (“[C]rowdfunding” enables entrepreneurs who
traditionally face financing constraints to obtain capital from anyone in the world via the
Internet.”); Ryan Sanchez, The New Crowdfunding Exemption: Only Time Will Tell, 14 U.C.
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 109, 114 (2013) (“[C]rowdfunding uses the internet to broadly solicit
capital . . . .”). Although financing for businesses and projects can be crowdsourced without
using the Internet, this article narrowly uses the term to describe the crowdsourcing of funds
online. See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 11 (2012) (“The basic concept of crowdfunding is not new. . . . But
Internet-based crowdfunding is relatively new.”); Stuart R. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding
Registration Exemption: Good Idea, Bad Execution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1433, 1434 (2012)
(“The crowdfunding concept is not new. . . . The term has become synonymous with efforts
to raise funds from numerous donors, usually in small amounts through internet sources.”);
Joseph J. Dehner & Jin Kong, Equity-Based Crowdfunding Outside the USA, 83 U. CIN. L.
REV. 413, 415 (2014) (“As a general proposition, equity crowdfunding occurs via the
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to take the business finance world by storm at least ten years ago.10 A
product of Web 2.0—the intersection of e-commerce applications with
social media—crowdfunding represents populist, Internet-based business
finance. 11 Through crowdfunding, Main Street has the ability to get
involved in an activity previously reserved to Wall Street actors: financing
new and emerging business ventures. 12
A. Equity Crowdfunding as a Securities Offering
Crowdfunding may, but need not, include transactions in securities.13
When crowdfunding involves the solicitation of an investment in equity
securities (financial instruments that typically have the capacity to comprise
Internet, though there is no requirement for this to be the medium of solicitation.”); Frye,
supra,
at
179
(“While
the
concept
behind crowdfunding is old, Internetbased crowdfunding is quite new.”).
10. See Edan Burkett, A Crowdfunding Exemption? Online Investment Crowdfunding
and U.S. Securities Regulation, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 63, 70-71 (2011)
(“Michael Sullivan apparently coined the term ‘crowdfunding’ in 2006, but the phenomenon
had, by that time, already existed in some form for perhaps a decade or more.”); Joan
MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and
the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN L. REV. 879, 880 n.2 (2011) (citing sources using the
term “crowdfunding” as early as 2008).
11. See Pekmezovic & Walker, supra note 9, at 366 (“The rise of websites such as
Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn—websites generally associated with the emergence of Web
2.0—as well as the popular payment services site PayPal, enabled crowdfunding to gain
greater visibility.”); John S. (Jack) Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowdfund Act:
Zuckerberg, Saverin, and Venture Capitalists' Dilution of the Crowd, 15 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 583, 592 (2013) (“Crowdfunding thus embodies “Web 2.0,” which capitalizes on
the wisdom of the crowd and involves users in the creative process.”); Sherief Morsy, Note,
The JOBS Act and Crowdfunding: How Narrowing the Secondary Market Handicaps Fraud
Plaintiffs, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1373, 1377 (2014) (“Crowdfunding is a combination of
crowdsourcing and microfinance, enabled by social networking.”).
12. See Andrew A. Schwartz, The Digital Shareholder, 100 MINN. L. REV. 609, 627
(2015) (noting the likely diversity of crowdfunding investors and describing crowdfunded
financing as “a nationwide (or statewide) market available to anyone with an Internet
connection.”); Wroldsen, supra note 11, at 611 (“Crowdfunding brings the masses of
everyday retail investors into what historically has been the nearly exclusive domain of
venture capitalists and other wealthy investors.”); Morsy, supra note 11, at 1377
(“Crowdfunding websites solicit investments from ordinary people for projects.”).
13. See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 9, at 31 (“Crowdfunding offerings of the donation,
reward, and pre-purchase type clearly do not involve securities for purposes of federal law.
Crowdfunding sites organized on the lending model probably are offering securities if the
lender is promised interest. Crowdfunding sites organized on the equity model are usually
offering securities.”); Wroldsen, supra note 11, at 587-90 (describing five models of
crowdfunding, noting that two of the five involve transactions in securities).
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both financial and governance components), it often is referred to as “equity
crowdfunding.” 14 “Equity crowdfunding offers investors a share of the
profits or return of the business they are helping to fund.” 15
Having said that, not every crowdfunded offering of a profit-sharing
instrument or interest is equity crowdfunding. Investment contracts that are
not classifiable as equity instruments may include profit or revenue
sharing. 16 The crowdfunding of investment contracts was a catalyst for the
enactment of, and has been occurring under, the CROWDFUND Act. 17
The most common type of equity crowdfunding involves the offer and
sale of corporate stock, typically over the Internet.18 However, limited
14. See Michael B. Dorff, The Siren Call of Equity Crowdfunding, 39 J. CORP. L. 493,
495 (2014) (describing equity crowdfunding as “selling off equity stakes (such as stock in
the company) through crowdfunding”); Garry A. Gabison, Equity Crowdfunding: All
Regulated but Not Equal, 13 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 359, 362 (2015) (defining equity
crowdfunding as “a limited Initial Public Offering (‘IPO’) conducted via an internet
intermediary, often called a funding portal, and during this internet-based IPO, companies
seeking funds give campaign contributors stakes into their ventures—in the form of shares—
in exchange for contributions”); Christine Hurt, Pricing Disintermediation: Crowdfunding
and Online Auction IPOs, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 217, 238-39 (defining equity crowdfunding
as “the sale of participatory interests to the general public over the Internet”). Admittedly,
some commentators use equity crowdfunding in a broader sense, to refer to all investment
crowdfunding. E.g., David Groshoff, Equity Crowdfunding As Economic Development?, 38
CAMPBELL L. REV. 317, 326 (2016) (“[T]his Article uses equity crowdfunding to describe
investment crowdfunding that may also be debt or some other security.”); Anjanette H.
Raymond & Abbey Stemler, Trusting Strangers: Dispute Resolution in the Crowd, 16
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 357, 361 (2015) (describing equity crowdfunding as
“crowdfunding through profit sharing”); Schwartz, supra note 12, at 678 (“Although it is
sometimes called ‘equity crowdfunding,’ startups will be allowed to sell any type of security
they wish, not just equity or common stock.”). This article uses the term in its narrow, more
literal, sense.
15. Bradford, supra note 9, at 24.
16. Joan MacLeod Heminway, What Is a Security in the Crowdfunding Era?, 7 OHIO
ST. ENTREP. BUS. L.J. 335, 360 (2012).
17. Heminway, supra note 9, at 877-78 (describing the offering of investment contracts
before the enactment of the CROWDFUND Act); Heminway, supra note 16, at 360 (“The
use of investment contracts . . . became more prominent in the crowdfunding environment
that existed in the year or two before the U.S. federal government began to take an interest in
crowdfunding—the time period leading up to Congress’s adoption of the JOBS Act.”); Jack
Wroldsen, Crowdfunding Investment Contracts, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 543, 555, 569-70,
573-76 (2017) (describing unequity offered before the enactment of the CROWDFUND Act
and the offering of revenue-sharing and SAFE instruments under the CROWDFUND Act).
18. See id. (noting that, before enactment and effectiveness of the CROWDFUND Act,
“[o]ne study found that one-third of all crowdfunding sites that offered investor rewards
offered stock”).
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liability company (“LLC”) membership interests and partnership interests
also are equity instruments. Both LLC and limited partnership equity
interests may be offered and sold through crowdfunding—in fact, LLC
equity interests already are being sold in CROWDFUND Act offerings. 19
This article focuses primary attention on the offer and sale of corporate
stock, but much of the description and analysis also applies to the sale of
equity in other entities—at least to the extent that those equity interests
constitute securities. Corporate stock, LLC membership interests, and
limited partnership interests typically are classified as securities under
applicable federal and state law.
B. Federal Regulation of CROWDFUND Act Securities Offerings
Equity crowdfunding, as a financing method involving the offer and sale
of securities, 20 engages securities regulation. Specifically, in the United
States, under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “1933 Act”), 21
absent an exemption, an issuer must register the offer and sale of
investment instruments categorized as securities.22 Registration, which
provides standardized public information to potential investors and others,
requires the preparation of a comprehensive disclosure document—a
registration statement—that includes specifics about the issuing firm, the
subject securities, and the offering. That registration statement must then be
filed with the SEC. 23 The registration process requires the issuer to commit
19. See Marc A. Leaf et al., Leading the Crowd: An Analysis of the First 50 Crowdfunding
Offerings, DRINKER BIDDLE (July 14, 2016), http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/insights/
publications/2016/07/leading-the-crowd-first-50-crowdfunding-offerings?noredirect=true
(noting that five of the first fifty offerings under the CROWDFUND Act involved the offer and
sale of LLC units).
20. See Hurt, supra note 14, at 238 (“The offer and sale of stock or shares in a
corporation clearly involves the offer and sale of securities under the plain language of
Section 2(a)(1). Likewise, the offer or sale of an investment interest in a limited partnership,
limited liability company, or even unincorporated project may be a security . . . .”).
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77aa (2012).
22. Id. § 77e; see also Bradford, supra note 9, at 42 (“Offerings of securities must be
registered with the SEC unless an exemption is available.”).
23. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f, 77g (describing the process for the registration of offers and
sales of securities and the contents of a registration statement); see also Heminway &
Hoffman, supra note 10, at 908 (“As for the federal registration requirements, an issuer must
file a registration statement that includes operating and financial disclosures about the issuer,
information about the securities being offered and sold, and details about the plan of
distribution of those securities.”); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, IPOs and
the Slow Death of Section 5, 102 KY. L.J. 891, 894 (2014) (“An issuer seeking to raise
capital in a public offering must first prepare and file a detailed disclosure document with
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personnel and financial resources to the process, which ordinarily takes
several months to complete. 24 State securities regulatory bodies, commonly
known as “blue sky” commissions, engage in parallel regulation of
securities offerings, and that state regulation applies in tandem with the
federal regulation, unless preempted.25 Under the CROWDFUND Act, state
law registration of compliant offerings is expressly preempted. 26
Before enactment of the CROWDFUND Act, no clear exemption existed
for crowdfunded offerings of securities. 27 The broad solicitation of
investment dollars from the masses that crowdfunding employs typically is
synonymous with a public offering—an offering to those who may not be
sophisticated or otherwise able to adequately fend for themselves; an
offering that compels application of the protective regime that registration

the SEC, called the registration statement, and then await the SEC staff's approval before
actually selling the securities.”).
24. See generally Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 10, at 908-10 (commenting, in
sum, that “[r]egistration of the offer and sale of securities under the Securities Act is an
expensive and time-consuming proposition”).
25. See generally James D. Cox, Who Can't Raise Capital?: The Scylla and Charybdis
of Capital Formation, 102 KY. L.J. 849, 850 (2014) (“[T]he Securities Act of 1933 treated
state and federal regulation of securities offerings as complementary, and they so operated
for sixty years.”); Manning Gilbert Warren III, The Role of the States in the Regulation of
Private Placements, 102 KY. L.J. 971, 978-79 (2014) (footnote omitted) (“[Congress]
specifically enacted a savings clause in the 1933 Act preserving the power of the states to
regulate securities. In doing so, Congress established a dual regulatory system that has
largely flourished ever since.”); Theodore Weitz & Thomas D. Halket, State Crowdfunding
and the Intrastate Exemption Under Federal Securities Laws—Less Than Meets the Eye?, 34
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 521, 526-28 (2015) (“[B]eginning in 1933 the United States
Congress enacted a series of laws regulating the issuance and trading of securities and
establishing the SEC as the chief federal regulator in this area. . . . Securities are also
regulated on the state level by laws commonly known as blue sky laws.”).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(C).
27. See Bradford, supra note 9, at 44 (“Companies selling securities on crowdfunding
sites could avoid registration if an exemption were available. . . . Unfortunately, none of
those exemptions is conducive to crowdfunding.” (footnotes omitted)); Edward A. Fallone,
Crowdfunding and Sport: How Soon Until the Fans Own the Franchise?, 25 MARQ. SPORTS
L. REV. 7, 20 (2014) (“Prior to 2012, offerings of securities sold under the equity
crowdfunding model were not a good fit with the available exemptions from registration.”);
Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 10, at 912 (noting before enactment of the
CROWDFUND Act, that, among “[t]he few possible transactional registration exemptions
under the Securities Act that one would consider in connection with a primary offering of
interests in a crowdfunded business . . . . none . . . provides a feasible path for a
crowdfunding website or crowdfunded venture to avoid registering the offer or sale of profitsharing interests” (footnotes omitted)).
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provides. 28 The CROWDFUND Act, signed into law in April 2012 and first
operative under enabling SEC regulations in May 2016, 29 introduces a new
section 4(a)(6) to the 1933 Act (also sometimes denominated section 4(6),
as a hold-over reference from prior iterations of section 4 of the 1933 Act)
that provides an exemption from registration for crowdfunded offerings of
securities that comply with specified requirements (the “Crowdfunding
Exemption”). 30
1. Offering Registration Exemption
Overall, the Crowdfunding Exemption allows issuers to raise limited
amounts of funding (initially, up to $1,000,000 in a twelve-month period)
through open, public solicitations of investments in securities as long as
those solicitations are conducted over the Internet through one of two
mandated types of registered securities intermediary under required
procedures and subject to required disclosures about the securities issuer,
the securities, and the offering. 31 The securities intermediary must be either
a broker or a funding portal (the latter being a new type of registered
intermediary created under the CROWDFUND Act). 32 Investors are limited
in the aggregate amount they can invest (based on the investor’s annual
income or net worth) through offerings qualifying under the Crowdfunding
Exemption. 33
Although the Crowdfunding Exemption became law in 2012, it was not
automatically effective or self-actuating. The CROWDFUND Act expressly
28. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (“Since
exempt transactions are those as to which ‘there is no practical need for [the bill's]
application,’ the applicability of § 4(1) should turn on whether the particular class of persons
affected needs the protection of the Act. An offering to those who are shown to be able to
fend for themselves is a transaction ‘not involving any public offering.’” (alteration in
original)); see also Bradford, supra note 9, at 45 (“Crowdfunded offerings are not limited to
sophisticated investors. Most crowdfunding sites are open to the general public—the whole
point of crowdfunding is to appeal to this ‘crowd.’”); Nicholas Herdrich, Just Say No to
Crowdfunding, 6 U.P.R. BUS. L.J. 157, 175-76 (2015) (“Crowdfunding opens investment
opportunities to non-accredited investors, who are historically viewed as investors that are
vulnerable to fraud and unable to easily absorb financial loss.”); Wroldsen, supra note 11, at
603 (“[H]istorical precedent demonstrates the need for investor protections when small
businesses sell unregistered stock to unsophisticated investors over the Internet . . . .”).
29. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6); see also Cohn, supra note 9, 1438 (“The crowdfunding
registration exemption has been embedded as new § 4(6) of 1933 Securities Act.”).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A), (C), (D); id. § 77d-1(b).
32. Id. § 77d(a)(6)(C); id. § 77d-1(a).
33. Id. § 77d(a)(6)(B).
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required SEC rulemaking before the Crowdfunding Exemption could
become operative. 34 The applicable SEC rules were finalized in October
2015 (the “Crowdfunding Rules”). 35
2. Resale Restrictions
Under the Crowdfunding Rules, the availability of the Crowdfunding
Exemption appears to be conditioned on compliance with resale
restrictions. 36 Both the Crowdfunding Exemption and the Crowdfunding
Rules address an investor’s ability to transfer securities acquired in a
crowdfunded offering exempt from registration under the CROWDFUND
Act. In each case, resales of securities acquired in an offering conducted
using the Crowdfunding Exemption are prohibited for a one-year period
following the date on which the securities are purchased, with certain
exceptions. 37 Those exceptions expressly include transfers
•
•
•
•

to the issuer of the securities,
to an accredited investor,
in a registered offering,
to a family member of the purchaser (or the equivalent), or

34. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(c), 126 Stat. 306,
320 (2012) (“Not later than 270 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Securities
and Exchange Commission . . . shall issue such rules as the Commission determines may be
necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors to carry out sections 4(6) and section
4A of the Securities Act of 1933, as added by this title.”).
35. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,387 (Nov. 16, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200,
227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269, and 274).
36. See 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(4) (2016) (“An issuer may offer or sell securities in
reliance on section 4(a)(6) . . . provided that . . . [t]he issuer complies with the requirements
in section 4A(b) . . . and the related requirements in this part; provided, however, that the
failure to comply with §§ 227.202, 227.203(a)(3) and 227.203(b) shall not prevent an issuer
from relying on the exemption provided by section 4(a)(6) . . . .” (first emphasis added)); see
also Bradford, supra note 9, at 144-45 (“[I]f resale restrictions are given any teeth, such
resales could cause issuers to lose their exemptions.”). Interestingly, the CROWDFUND Act
does not expressly condition the availability of the Crowdfunding Exemption on compliance
with the resale restrictions. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (setting forth express conditions to the
availability of the Crowdfunding Exemption); id. § 77d-1(e)(1) (noting that the transfer of
securities is restricted, but not that compliance is a condition to availability of the
Crowdfunding Exemption).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(e)(1); 17 C.F.R. § 227.501.
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• in connection with the death or divorce of the purchaser or other
similar circumstance.38
Under the Crowdfunding Exemption, the SEC is afforded express
discretion over the “similar circumstance” to death or divorce.39 Moreover,
resales under the Crowdfunding Exemption are “subject to such other
limitations as the Commission shall, by rule, establish.” 40 The SEC also has
general exemptive power and interpretive influence under the 1933 Act that
would encompass these matters. 41
Rule 501 of Regulation Crowdfunding incorporates and expands upon
the CROWDFUND Act’s resale restrictions. 42 Rule 501 clarifies that the
Crowdfunding Exemption’s resale restrictions apply to any purchaser
during the one-year period beginning when the securities were first
issued. 43 In other words, the resale restrictions apply to those who purchase
securities from an initial purchaser (one who buys from the issuer) and that
initial purchaser’s direct and indirect transferees during the one-year period
following the initial purchase. Under Rule 501, Crowdfunding Exemption
purchasers reselling to an accredited investor (which the rule defines using
the existing definition in Regulation D under the 1933 Act) must have a
reasonable belief that the purchaser qualifies as an accredited investor. 44
The SEC also provides in Rule 501 that transfers are permitted during the
one-year restricted period in several enumerated (and similar)
circumstances: to certain trusts, to family members and others in equivalent

38. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(e)(1)(A)-(D).
39. Id. § 77d-1(e)(1)(D).
40. Id. § 77d-1(e)(2).
41. See id. § 77z-3; Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34, 39 (N.D.
Cal. 1939) (“The administrative construction placed upon the Act by the Commission is
entitled to great weight.”).
42. 17 C.F.R. § 227.501. Regulation Crowdfunding includes the rules set forth id. §
227.100 through id. § 227.503.
43. See id. § 227.501(a) (providing that securities issued in an offering conducted under
the Crowdfunding Exemption “may not be transferred by any purchaser of such securities
during the one-year period beginning when the securities were issued in a transaction
exempt from registration”).
44. See id. § 227.501(b) (“[T]he term accredited investor shall mean any person who
comes within any of the categories set forth in § 230.501(a) of this chapter, or who the seller
reasonably believes comes within any of such categories, at the time of the sale of the
securities to that person.”).
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relationships, and in connection with death or divorce. 45 The rule defines
the family and equivalent relationships necessary to an understanding of the
scope of the rule. 46 Finally, the Crowdfunding Rules mandate that investor
education materials provided to potential investors explain the resale
restrictions. 47
II. Observations About U.S. Equity Crowdfunding Resale Restrictions
From the very start, the idea of restricting resales of securities acquired
in CROWDFUND Act offerings was controversial. Before, at, and after the
enactment of the Act, many were or have been critical of the resale
restrictions as unnecessary or undesirable from the standpoint of investor
protection or investor relations or as harmful to a potentially desirable
securities offering market. 48 Others have been more sanguine about the
inclusion of resale restrictions in a system of securities crowdfunding
regulation geared to minimize fraud and support the development of a
fledgling trading market (depending on the other elements of regulation that
may be employed). 49
45. See id. § 227.501(a)(4) (permitting transfers during the one-year restricted period to
(among others) “a trust controlled by the purchaser” or, “to a trust created for the benefit of a
member of the family of the purchaser or the equivalent”).
46. See id. § 227.501(c) (defining family members to include “a child, stepchild,
grandchild, parent, stepparent, grandparent, spouse or spousal equivalent, sibling, mother-inlaw, father-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, brother-in-law, or sister-in-law of the
purchaser, and . . . adoptive relationships” and defining spousal equivalents as “a cohabitant
occupying a relationship generally equivalent to that of a spouse”).
47. See id. § 227.302(b)(1)(iii) (“In connection with establishing an account for an
investor, an intermediary must deliver educational materials to such investor that explain in
plain language and are otherwise designed to communicate effectively and accurately: . . .
[t]he restrictions on the resale of a security offered and sold in reliance on section 4(a)(6) of
the Securities Act.”).
48. See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 9, at 144 (“Restrictions on resale are neither
necessary nor desirable, although their presence will not unduly chill use of the
exemption.”); Morsy, supra note 11, at 1393 (“[W]hile the one-year resale restriction
tenuously serves an anti-fraud purpose, it ultimately harms investors more than it helps
them.”).
49. See, e.g., Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 10, at 948-49, 954 (noting resale
restrictions in a list of possible “general substantive attributes” of a securities crowdfunding
registration exemption and offering that ‘restricting . . . resale . . . may help constrain fraud,
which may be more likely to occur in resale markets”); Darian M. Ibrahim, Crowdfunding
Without the Crowd, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1481, 1501–02 (2017) (positing that “resale restrictions
and other liquidity issues” may help constrain overoptimistic or untrue promotional
statements on crowdfunding platform message boards); Jason W. Parsont, Crowdfunding:
The Real and the Illusory Exemption, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 281, 332 (2014) (“Since this
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This diversity of opinion is noted in the SEC’s final rulemaking
release. 50 Yet, the SEC determined to preserve the congressionally imposed
one-year holding period and to clarify its application to all transactions
occurring during the year after the initial sale of securities under the
CROWDFUND Act. 51 Experience with resales of equity securities acquired
in offerings conducted under the Crowdfunding Exemption, just a bit more
that a full year in operation at the time work on this article was completed,
will reveal whether any (and, if so, which) of the points made by
commentators may be borne out in reality. 52 In the interim, however,
certain general observations can be made about the resale limitations
imposed in the Crowdfunding Exemption and under the Crowdfunding
Rules on crowdfunded stock in relation to a shareholder’s right to sell.
A. Effects on Shareholder Financial and Governance Rights
The restrictions on resale in the CROWDFUND Act, like other transfer
restrictions, may hamper the development of a liquid trading market for the
affected securities. 53 This effect, in turn, makes it harder for investors to
market will lack the primary protection afforded to investors in the public market, the SEC
should be cautious in facilitating an unfettered resale market in retail crowdfunding, even if
it is limited to accredited investors.”).
50. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,387, 71,475 (Nov. 16, 2015) (“Two commenters
supported the proposed restrictions on resales, while several other commenters opposed any
resale restrictions.” (footnote omitted)).
51. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
52. Cf. Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the
Securities Laws—-Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on
Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1765 (2012) (“Only time will tell whether the
express disclosure requirements in new section 4(6) of the 1933 Act will be sufficient to
provide meaningful investor protection.”).
53. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Political Economy of Crowdsourcing: Markets for
Labor, Rewards, and Securities, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 35, 50 (2015) (“The amounts
invested are too small and the likelihood of major economic gains are too slight to justify the
investments that would be required to create a secondary market.”); Ibrahim, supra note 49,
at 1506 n.57 (2017) (“[I]t remains to be seen what secondary markets might develop for
crowdfunding securities.”); Parsont, supra note 49, at 323 (noting that the resale restrictions,
together with other features of the Crowdfunding Exemption, “will likely prevent a liquid
secondary market comprised of knowledgeable professional investors from developing”);
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 652 (“[T]here will likely be only a very limited and illiquid
secondary market for crowdfunded securities.”); id. at 655 (“[T]here is unlikely to be much
of a secondary market for crowdfunded securities, and definitely not one as deep and liquid
as for traditional public companies.”); Andrew A. Schwartz. Keep It Light, Chairman White:
SEC Rulemaking Under the Crowdfund Act, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 43, 49 (2013)
[hereinafter Schwartz, Keep It Light] (“The secondary market for crowdfunded securities is
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realize value from their investments, since they may or may not find a ready
and willing buyer for their securities when they want to exit their
investments. 54 Moreover, the lack of a public market is likely to result in a
marketability discount in the pricing of any investments sold.55 Of course,
security holders still have the possibility of earning a current return on their
investments through distributions. For equity holders, this means that they
likely will be required to rely more heavily on dividends (or the equivalent
in non-corporate entities) and repurchases—both of which are dependent on
board action and subject to statutory constraints—in assessing the financial
value of their investments. 56
Share transfer restrictions also affect the shareholders’ individual and
collective abilities to discipline or signal to management through sales of
their securities. 57 Without a liquid public market for securities, the message
sent to management may be nonexistent, weak, or unclear, and the effects
sharply limited by the Act . . . .”).
54. See Hicks, supra note 7, at 421 (noting that an investor whose shares are subject to
resale restrictions “loses the full range of opportunities that market liquidity provides to a
security owner whose circumstances or investment needs have changed”); Schwartz, supra
note 12, at 668 (“[T]he JOBS Act expressly prohibits a secondary market for a year after
issuance. Even after that, the number of shares available will generally be too small to make
practical a secondary market.” (footnote omitted)); Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding
Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1457, 1463 (2013) (“Crowdfunded companies, by
contrast, are likely to have only thousands of securities outstanding, making it difficult and
expensive to transact in them.”).
55. See, e.g., Hicks, supra note 7, at 421 (“Where an owner is foreclosed from the retail
market and shunted into private transactions, he is likely to encounter a smaller number of
potential purchasers and a lower sale price.”).
56. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (West 2010); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). Professor Julian Velasco commented on the nature of shareholders’
dividend rights a decade ago.
The right to receive dividends is a limited one, both in law and in fact. Legally,
shareholders only have the right to receive such dividends as are declared by
the corporation's board of directors. Directors have no obligation to declare
dividends and may reinvest the corporation's profits rather than distribute them
to shareholders. Shareholders only have a legal right to the payment of
dividends after, and to the extent that, the board of directors declares any.
Velasco, Fundamental, supra note 2, at 414 (footnote omitted). Nothing has changed in the
intervening ten years.
57. See, e.g., Hicks, supra note 7, at 421 (“He cannot as easily dissociate himself from
an issuer if for any reason he becomes dissatisfied with its management.”); Schwartz, supra
note 12, at 652 (“The discipline of takeovers cannot be translated from traditional public
companies to crowdfunded ones. As in the case of proxy contests, most crowdfunded
companies will likely sell only a minority interest to the crowd, rendering a takeover
impossible.” (footnote omitted)).
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on the market for corporate control may be correspondingly uncertain.
Moreover, at least one commentator has identified the possibility that the
resale restrictions under the Crowdfunding Exemption create the
opportunity for shareholder oppression akin to that in closely held firms. 58
These governance-oriented aspects of a shareholder’s right to sell may
contribute to discounted trading prices.
Yet, it is important to recognize that under the Crowdfunding
Exemption, transfers to accredited investors are not subject to the one-year
transfer restriction period. As a result, a market can develop among
accredited investors even within the first year after primary sales are made
under the CROWDFUND Act. If a secondary trading market is cultivated
and sustained, the negative financial and governance effects of the resale
restrictions under the Act may be less significant than they otherwise would
be.
Also, the overall transfer restriction period under the Crowdfunding
Exemption is only one year from the date of the initial purchase in the
primary offering, which allows for a trading market to develop after that
one-year period. Under Rule 144 (which initially included holding periods
of two and three years for the unregistered resale of securities acquired in a
transaction or chain of transactions not involving a public offering), a
significant resale market eventually was generated. 59 The SEC has
decreased holding periods under Rule 144 over the past twenty years,
58. Schwartz, Keep It Light, supra note 53, at 54 (“[T]he lack of a liquid secondary
market creates the same potential for oppression in the crowdfunding context that is found in
the close corporation.”).
59. See generally, e.g., Onnig H. Dombalagian, Principles for Publicness, 67 FLA. L.
REV. 649, 662 (2015) (“In recent years, prospective purchasers of securities in traditional
private placements have likewise looked to electronic trading venues for liquidity. Trading
venues such as SecondMarket and SharesPost typically operate as traditional agency
markets.”); Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1, 16-35
(2012) (describing the direct market—the secondary market for the stock of corporate startups); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, "Publicness" in Contemporary
Securities Regulation After the Jobs Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 349-50 (2013) [hereinafter
Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness] (describing two equity trading platforms,
SecondMarket and SharesPost); Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law's Dirty Little Secret, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3402-06 (2013) (describing the growth of secondary trading
markets for accredited investors); Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing
the Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV.
1573, 1595-96, 1614 (2013) [hereinafter Thompson & Langevoort, Capital Raising] (“[T]he
growth in platforms such as SecondMarket and SharesPost expanded trading outlets for
shares not listed in stock exchanges or that otherwise have not become public companies
under the '34 Act.”).
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ostensibly without a significant change in investor protection or market
integrity, which facilitated the development of these markets. 60 In like
manner, a strong primary market for unregistered offerings under the
CROWDFUND Act may also generate a robust—even if not fully liquid—
resale market. If offerings under the Crowdfunding Exemption foster a
healthy, ongoing secondary market for crowdfunded equity, shareholders
may be able to realize some financial (and maybe even governance) rights
akin to those of their public-company brethren. 61
B. Effects on Public Offerings of Securities
“U.S. federal securities law does not hold out a unitary concept of
publicness, nor does it necessarily mandate a single path to becoming
public.” 62 Yet, the registered public offering has traditionally been the
lodestar for analysis and the key entry point for firms that want to initiate
and develop a public market for their equity securities in the United
States. 63 Public-company status is important in no small part because of the
positive effects on issuers and investors created by a strong, liquid
secondary market associated with public-company status.
60. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Rebalancing Private Placement Regulation, 36
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1143, 1149-51 (2013) (tracing the history of decreased holding periods
under Rule 144 and noting the SEC’s view that investor protection was not diminished
through these changes); see also Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra note 59, at 351
(“The 1933 Act's restriction on resales of restricted securities that began at three years in the
early years of the Act has now shrunk to one year because of the changes to Rule 144 . . . .”);
Thompson & Langevoort, Capital Raising, supra note 59, at 1595-96, 1613-14
(summarizing and commenting on the shortening of holding periods under Rule 144 over
time); Parsont, supra note 49, at 325 (“[N]ew secondary markets have emerged to facilitate
private security resales.”).
61. But see Schwartz, supra note 12, at 652 (“The discipline of takeovers cannot be
translated from traditional public companies to crowdfunded ones. As in the case of proxy
contests, most crowdfunded companies will likely sell only a minority interest to the crowd,
rendering a takeover impossible.” (footnote omitted)).
62. Dombalagian, supra note 59, at 668.
63. See id. at 655 (“The most basic gradation of publicness might encompass companies
that have offered for sale to the general public debt or equity interests that are freely
alienable without further negotiation of exit rights. The canonical example is a company that
has made a ‘registered public offering’ under section 5 of the Securities Act.” (footnote
omitted)); Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 23, at 894 (“Contemporaneous with the
public offering the issuer will typically list its securities on a securities exchange, so that
secondary trading of the newly issued securities begins immediately.”); A. C. Pritchard,
Revisiting "Truth in Securities" Revisited: Abolishing IPOs and Harnessing Private Markets
in the Public Good, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 999, 1000 (2013) (describing initial public
offerings as “the customary path for attaining public-company status”).
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In addition to providing money, shareholders create the
secondary market for shares. A well-functioning market for
shares allows existing shareholders to exit at a price that is a
reasonable estimate of the value of the investment in the firm
and likewise allows new shareholders to enter at a reasonable
price. Moreover, a secondary trading market with reasonably
accurate prices means that shares can be used to make
acquisitions without dilution of the buying firm's shareholders
(in the case of undervalued shares) or dilution of the selling
firm's shareholders (in the case of overvalued shares). Similarly,
a reasonably accurate stock price makes stock- or option-based
compensation a more useful tool for aligning manager and
shareholder interests. 64
These benefits are available to public companies, but not all public
companies have the active, efficient trading markets that afford the full
range of these benefits.
Although public offerings long have been the primary means of creating
public securities trading markets in the United States, “[t]here is nothing
about public offerings . . . that makes them inherently antecedent to publiccompany status.” 65 The CROWDFUND Act introduces a new, unregistered,
wide-reaching brand of securities offering into the mix of capital-raising
alternatives that, together with other changes in U.S. securities regulation,
may become a new gateway to public securities markets. The resale
provisions of the CROWDFUND Act constitute a significant piece of the
regulatory puzzle that engages shareholder liquidity, public offerings, and
public markets.
Equity crowdfunding qualifies as a public offering under the accepted
standard definition adopted in decisional law more than sixty years ago. 66

64. Edward B. Rock, Shareholder Eugenics in the Public Corporation, 97 CORNELL L.
REV. 849, 854-55 (2012) (footnote omitted); see also Schwartz, supra note 1, at 772 (“An
important aspect of the corporation is its facilitation of passive investments by individual
investors, which the corporation can then aggregate to permit large-scale investments and
operations.”).
65. Pritchard, supra note 63, at 1001.
66. See sources cited supra note 28 and accompanying text; see also C. Steven
Bradford, Shooting the Messenger: The Liability of Crowdfunding Intermediaries for the
Fraud of Others, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 371, 391 (2014); John S. Wroldsen, The Crowdfund
Act's Strange Bedfellows: Democracy and Start-Up Company Investing, 62 U. KAN. L. REV.
357, 381 (2013) (“[C]rowdfunding offerings are unregistered ‘initial public
offerings,’ . . . .”).
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Specifically, because crowdfunded offerings are made through general
solicitations over the Internet, there is no guarantee that investors can fend
for themselves or that they otherwise are adequately protected absent
registration of the offering under the 1933 Act.67 As a result, the
Crowdfunding Exemption provides an alternative disclosure scheme, scaled
to and otherwise customized for use in a CROWDFUND Act offering. 68
That scheme, along with other aspects of offerings using the Crowdfunding
Exemption, places equity crowdfunding somewhere in the nether land
between public offerings and private placements in the spectrum of offering
regulation. 69
The Crowdfunding Exemption’s resale restrictions distinguish equity
offerings under the CROWDFUND Act from public offerings of equity as
they existed prior to the adoption of the Act. In particular, registered public
offerings of securities allow for free resales of those securities by nonaffiliates of the issuer, facilitating trading markets. 70 Typically, holding
period restrictions are imposed in connection with private placements of
securities and other unregistered securities offerings to control the market
for securities by preventing an indirect unregistered distribution of the

67. See sources cited supra note 28 and accompanying text; see also Bradford, supra
note 9, at 109 (“[C]rowdfunding is open to the general public, and many members of ‘the
crowd’ are not that financially well-informed.”); Cox, supra note 25, at 854 (“[T]he
participants in crowdfunding cannot be expected to be sophisticated, or to have sufficient
investment at stake to merit professional representation, and are so dispersed as to encounter
non-trivial costs to engage in coordinated response.”).
68. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 227.201-.202 (2016) (comprising the disclosure and reporting
requirements under the Crowdfunding Exemption); Hazen, supra note 52, at 1765 (“The
JOBS Act conditions the crowdfunding exemption on disclosure to investors which quite
properly preserves the proper balance by encouraging small business financings while also
giving appropriate consideration to investor protection.” (footnote omitted)).
69. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Crowdfunding and the Public/Private Divide in U.S.
Securities Regulation, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 477, 489 (2014) (“[T]he CROWDFUND Act . . .
appears to create an integrated offering and issuer status somewhere between public and
private by combining concepts from each regime.”); Parsont, supra note 49, at 323 (“Retail
crowdfunding is a hybrid between a public and a private offering.”).
70. See Hicks, supra note 7, at 432 (“A person who purchases securities in a registered
public offering will not discover resale restrictions imprinted on his stock certificate or other
evidence of ownership interest.”); J. William Hicks, Protection of Individual Investors
Under U.S. Securities Laws: The Impact of International Regulatory Competition, 1 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 431, 448 (1994) (“Securities that are sold in registered public
offerings may be resold immediately in any manner and in any amount by any person who is
not deemed to be an affiliate of the issuer.”).
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securities. 71 They are designed to serve as instruments of both investor and
market protection.72 Yet, restrictive holding periods are getting ever shorter
in length (as exemplified by the sequential changes to Rule 144) and may
have narrower application.73
In the wake of resale restrictions with short holding periods and
significant exceptions (like those under the CROWDFUND Act), the
protections of the 1933 Act become less significant. The principal
protection provided to investors under the 1933 Act is the requirement that
public offerings be registered.74 Given the human and financial capital
investment involved in the 1933 Act registration process,75 registered
public offerings will become a less favored option for raising capital.

71. See, e.g., C. Steven Bradford, Expanding The Non-Transactional Revolution: A New
Approach to Securities Registration Exemptions, 49 EMORY L.J. 437, 478-79 (2000) (noting
that holding period requirements help to establish the investment intent that helps securities
resellers avoid being classified as underwriters involved in a distribution of securities);
Dombalagian, supra note 59, at 673 (“The SEC has traditionally justified restrictions on the
offer and resale of securities as anti-evasion rules to discourage issuers from effecting
unregistered public offerings.”); Hicks, supra note 7, at 432 (“Holding period requirements
attach to securities that are sold pursuant to private placements under section 4(2) or 4(6) or
in limited offerings under rules 504 or 505 of Regulation D.” (footnotes omitted)); Parsont,
supra note 49, at 323 (describing the resale restrictions under the CROWDFUND Act as
“privatelike”).
72. See Hicks, supra note 7, at 471 (expressing concern that relaxing resale limitations
on privately placed securities may “jeopardize public confidence in our securities markets
and reduce investor protection in unregistered offerings”).
73. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. Professor Onnig Dombalagian notes the
following in this context:
Mechanistic limitations on the resale of securities have arguably lost some of
their luster as a strategy to check the emergence of secondary markets in
privately placed securities. Time and size restrictions—such as holding periods
or limitations on the amount of securities that can be freely resold in the wake
of an unregistered offering—are crude tools to slow the penetration of
securities into a secondary market because they force initial purchasers to
assume economic risk for a longer period of time.
Dombalagian, supra note 59, at 673 (footnote omitted).
74. See Stuart R. Cohn, The Impact of Securities Laws on Developing Companies:
Would the Wright Brothers Have Gotten Off the Ground?, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L.
315, 361 (1999) (describing the investor protection provided by 1933 act registration); Lucas
S. Osborn, The Leaky Common Law: An "Offer to Sell" as a Policy Tool in Patent Law and
Beyond, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 143, 159 (2013) (“To provide full and fair disclosure and
thus help protect investors, the act generally requires offering companies to file registration
statements with the Securities & Exchange Commission . . . .”).
75. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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One has to ask if we are not close to, if not at, a point at which it
will be seriously tempting for intermediaries to take on that
limited holding period (perhaps with some hedging of the risk) if
there are no limits or restrictions—other than antifraud rules—on
the dump that takes place thereafter. If so, that could be one
more nail in the coffin of the registered public offering and the
demise of the protections supposedly afforded by the '33 Act.76
Certainly, the human and money capital costs of registration and the
availability of viable primary offering alternatives that afford investors
appealing (even if not perfect) resale options decrease the importance of
registered public offerings as a means of accessing capital from the
public. 77
C. Effects on Offering and Trading Markets
Given that the U.S. Congress enacted legislation supporting equity
crowdfunding and that equity crowdfunding undertaken in compliance with
the Crowdfunding Exemption has the potential to be a new gateway to
public securities trading markets that facilitate resales of equity securities,
the effects of the CROWDFUND Act’s resale restrictions on public
securities markets bear some scrutiny. Among other things, to be successful
as a market for business finance, equity crowdfunding must present a costeffective alternative to other available financing options for all participants.
I have previously been critical of the costs of securities crowdfunding under
the CROWDFUND Act, speculating that the financial costs of the
proposition exceed its potential benefits for many firms. 78
76. Thompson & Langevoort, Capital Raising, supra note 59, at 1596.
77. See Chris Brummer, Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation, 84 FORDHAM
L. REV. 977, 1024 (2015). Specifically, Professor Brummer observes that
public offerings in the twenty-first century are even less legally and practically
necessary. . . . [T]echnology has worked alongside regulatory reforms to make
staying private easier and private placements more efficient and attractive.
These developments contrast considerably with the public offering process,
which is not only more costly than in the 1930s, but also presents fewer
obvious comparative advantages. As a result, the public offering process, and
indeed public company status, are faced with the uncomfortable prospect of
becoming increasingly marginalized as private markets and private market
infrastructure continue to develop in ways that maximize the flexibility of
recent regulatory reforms.
Id.
78. Heminway, supra note 9, at 880-85. Although the views expressed in that article
predate the adoption of final rules under the CROWDFUND Act, those final rules change
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In an April 2003 article, Professor Ron Gilson examined the U.S. venture
capital market to offer direction to other countries in establishing similar
markets. 79 A number of the observations he makes in that article provide
interesting insights into the emergent crowdfunding market. Specifically, he
perceives that three factors—uncertainty, information asymmetry, and
agency
costs—“inevitably
bedevil
early-stage,
high-technology
80
Although not all businesses financed through equity
financing.”
crowdfunding are high-technology firms, 81 crowdfunding involves the use
of technology and crowdfunded offerings typically provide early-stage
financing.
Perhaps because of these commonalities, Professor Gilson’s factors are
attributes of the prototypical firm seeking to use equity crowdfunding as a
financing method. 82 The faceless nature of the Internet as a transactional
medium adds uncertainty to the start-up and small-business environment in
which equity crowdfunding most often occurs. 83 Moreover, although the
Internet opens up avenues for direct and tailored communication, the
relative inexperience of issuers and investors, without intervention by
expert intermediaries, may prevent or delay the optimization balanced

the cost-benefit balance in only minor ways that do not affect the analysis enough to change
the conclusion.
79. Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1068-69 (2003).
80. Id. at 1069. Professor Gilson characterizes uncertainty, information asymmetry, and
agency costs as “three central problems” that “[a]ll financial contracts respond to.” Id. at
1076.
81. Professor Gilson observes that early-stage, high-technology firms manifest extreme
uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs. Id. at 1076. He notes in this
connection that “the technology base of the portfolio company's business exacerbates the
general uncertainty by adding scientific uncertainty,” “the fact that the portfolio company's
technology involves cutting-edge science assures that there will be a substantial information
asymmetry in favor of the entrepreneur even if the venture capital fund employs individuals
with advanced scientific training,” and “the significant variance associated with an early
stage, high technology company's expected returns” amplify agency costs. Id. at 1077.
82. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 612-13 (referencing Gilson’s work and asserting that
“[t]his well-known ‘trio of problems’ applies directly to crowdfunding, where they will
present themselves in “extreme form” due to the very early stage of the startups involved.”).
83. Id. at 630-31 (concluding that “uncertainty is at a height for the type of startups that
will use crowdfunding”); id. at 659 (“Investing in startups with no track record
through online crowdfunding presents tremendous uncertainty . . . for investors.”); Gmeleen
Faye B. Tomboc, The Lemons Problem in Crowdfunding, 30 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. &
PRIVACY L. 253, 267 (2013) (“[O]nline investors face greater uncertainty than investors in
offline brick and mortar businesses.”).
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information access. 84 Founders and promoters, among others, still may
benefit from information asymmetries. In addition, the impersonal nature of
Internet finance offerings creates opportunities for agency costs to surface
and escalate.85 Agency costs may be exacerbated by the same volatility in
expected returns that characterizes early-stage high-technology ventures,
expected returns that are impacted by resale restrictions under the
CROWDFUND Act. 86
The CROWDFUND Act is designed to address these three aspects of
issuers in the equity crowdfunding market principally through
governmental prescriptions and proscriptions that include mandatory
disclosure, the required use of a registered intermediary, expert financial
statement review, and other provisions. The resale restrictions in and under
the CROWDFUND Act, however, contribute little—if at all—to resolving
investor unease or market integrity questions in any of the three problem
areas. In fact, they may reinforce or magnify questions regarding
uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs. On the one hand, the
resale restrictions prevent the early generation of a realistic exit market for
non-accredited investors. Equity crowdfunding investors—at least some of
them—may be effectively locked into their investments, at least for a year.
On the other hand, the resale restrictions under the CROWDFUND Act
allow for the creation of an immediate realistic exit market for accredited
84. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 631-33 (concluding that “crowdfunded startups present
a great deal of information asymmetry.”); id. at 659 (“Investing in startups with no track
record through online crowdfunding presents . . . information asymmetries for investors.”);
Tomboc, supra note 83, at 279 (noting the high level of information asymmetry in
crowdfunding, quoting from and citing TOSHIO YAMAGISHI ET AL., SOLVING THE LEMONS
PROBLEM WITH REPUTATION, ETRUST: FORMING RELATIONSHIPS IN THE ONLINE WORLD 73
(Karen S. Cook et al. eds. 2009).
85. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 633-36 (generally describing agency costs and their
operation in the crowdfunding setting); Andrew A. Schwartz, The Nonfinancial Returns of
Crowdfunding, 34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 565, 571 (2015) (describing the potential
generation of agency costs by management and powerful investors).
86. Cf. J.W. Verret, Uber-Ized Corporate Law: Toward A 21st Century Corporate
Governance for Crowdfunding and App-Based Investor Communications, 41 J. CORP. L.
927, 944 (2016) (“Crowdfunding for many smaller startups will be characterized by a
relatively higher level of firm-specific executive talent and by a relatively illiquid secondary
market for the firm's securities relative to larger firms on public markets.”); Shekhar Darke,
Note, To Be or Not to Be s Funding Portal: Why Crowdfunding Platforms Will Become
Broker-Dealers, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 183, 188–89 (2014) (“One downside to
crowdfunding is small business and startup volatility. Investments in start-ups and small
businesses are not liquid . . . . Moreover, start-ups and small businesses are inherently
risky . . . .”).
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investors who may have networks of fellow accredited investors to whom
they can sell. Even these sales do not necessarily decrease uncertainty,
information asymmetries, and agency costs, however. Accredited investors
have the financial capacity to bear risk but may not have the capacity to
acquire, understand, and efficaciously process the information necessary to
optimal investment decision making. Accordingly, even after taking into
account the potential detriments associated with the resale restrictions
(including related observations about uncertainty, information asymmetry,
and agency costs), the costs of using the Crowdfunding Exemption may
outweigh its benefits. 87
Both the lack of existence of a resale market and support for an
unsustainable resale market may have adverse effects on the markets
involved in equity crowdfunding. To the extent that equity crowdfunding
investors are (or believe themselves to be) locked into their ownership of
the firm without governance power or influence over the firm, concerns
about uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs may dissuade
investors from buying stock in a crowdfunded offering. The governmental
creation and maintenance of a vigorous trading market for crowdfunded
equity when uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs
continue to exist at high levels may also impair the success of the equity
crowdfunding market. At the extreme, the equity crowdfunding market
could collapse and damage the overall investment market for start-ups and
early-stage ventures. 88 That would, indeed, be an undesirable and, for
many, unfortunate result.

87. Cf. Heminway, supra note 9, at 884-85 (noting that market participants may
continue to choose private placement transactions instead of securities crowdfunding for
early-stage financings). As I noted in earlier work, the creation of a crowdfunding market
that invites participation principally from accredited investors would be an unfortunate byproduct of the CROWDFUND Act, inconsistent with its original ostensible purpose.
A two–tiered system in which the general public—which includes non–
accredited investors—is left with unattractive investment options is inconsistent
with the spirit underlying the CROWDFUND Act. If, as I contend, the costs of
complying with the crowdfunding exemption shut promising small businesses
(both potential issuers and intermediaries) out of the capital market or shift
their preferences to private placement transactions involving a limited, elite
group of investors, then the CROWDFUND Act will have failed in its mission
and constitutes a waste of congressional and SEC resources.
Id. at 885.
88. See Gilson, supra note 79, at 1077 (concluding, with respect to the venture capital
market, that “[a]bsent a workable response, the extremity of uncertainty, information
asymmetry, and agency problems likely would raise the cost of external capital to a point of
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III. Conclusion
The right to sell is an important part of the shareholder rights package
and the regulatory and market structures in which equity investments are
made. Specifically, “[t]his right of alienation is of the utmost importance to
shareholders both because it is a means of obtaining economic benefit from
their investment in the corporation and because it is their means of exit
should they become dissatisfied with management.”89 Although a
shareholder’s right to sell in the public-company setting is (absent
contractual restrictions) relatively unfettered in the United States, privately
placed securities and securities in privately (and especially closely) held
firms are, by their legal nature under federal and state securities laws, more
limited. 90 Ideally, stock transfer restrictions imposed under the U.S.
securities laws strike “a proper balance between public protection and
securityholder freedom.” 91
Equity crowdfunding under the CROWDFUND Act occupies a
regulatory space somewhere between traditional, pre-JOBS Act public
offerings of securities and private placements of equity. 92 Resales of equity
securities acquired in an offering that complies with the Crowdfunding
Exemption are restricted for a one-year period. 93 This one-year holding
period is subject to certain exceptions, however, including an exception for
transfers to accredited investors.94 Given the relatively short holding period
and the potential to transfer shares to accredited investors, the extent to

market failure, leading to a similar collapse in the formation of early stage, high technology
companies”).
89. Velasco, Fundamental, supra note 2, at 425 (footnote omitted); see also Philip M.
Nichols, Creating a Market Along the Silk Road: A Comparison of Privatization Techniques
in Central Asia, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 299, 306 n.28 (1997) (“A functioning
secondary market in shares, of course, is vital both for allowing shareholders to appreciate
the value of their investment and for the purposes of applying market discipline to
management.”).
90. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also Robert C. Illig, Minority Investor
Protections as Default Norms: Using Price to Illuminate the Deal in Close Corporations, 56
AM. U.L. REV. 275, 288 n.43 (2006) (“This ability of public company shareholders to exit at
minimal cost is known informally as the ‘Wall Street Rule’ and is distinguished from the
close corporation context where no such exit is typically available.”).
91. Hicks, supra note 7, at 472.
92. See supra note 69 and accompanying text; see also Hurt, supra note 14, at 239
(“Crowdfunding via an Internet website walks a strange path between regulated public
offerings and exempt private placements . . . .”).
93. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss1/5

2017]

SELLING CROWDFUNDED EQUITY

213

which shareholder rights, securities offering regulation, and securities
trading markets are or may be affected by the CROWDFUND Act’s resale
restrictions remains unclear.
The uncertain long-term effects of the resale restrictions imposed in and
under the CROWDFUND Act have the capacity to impact equity investing
in all three of these areas. Shareholders with the limited monitoring rights
associated with public-company ownership but without the freedom to
resell in a liquid public market supported by standardized disclosures likely
would determine that their rights are undesirably limited. While
shareholders who purchase crowdfunded equity in an offering conducted
under the Crowdfunding Exemption do have limited monitoring rights,
standardized disclosures are required 95 and there is a capacity for market
development that may enable exit and the enjoyment of related shareholderrights benefits. 96 Moreover, although resale restrictions may be deemed to
prevent the development of public markets that would have benefits to
issuers and shareholders alike, the limited nature of resale restrictions under
the CROWDFUND Act may help to make equity crowdfunding an
attractive and superior alternative to registered public offerings for the
primary sale of equity securities. Relatedly, the limited resale restrictions
imposed on equity offerings under the CROWDFUND Act may enable a
more cost-effective development of public trading markets for stock in
privately held firms than is possible through traditional registered public
offerings. Even if trading markets are generated, however, they may or may
not be healthy or sustainable in the long term.
I am not a soothsayer; I make no predictions. But I sense from the
observations made in this article that the long-term potential for suitable
resale markets for crowdfunded equity—whether under the CROWDFUND
Act or otherwise—are important to the generation of capital for small
business firms (and especially start-ups and early-stage ventures). In that
context, three important areas of reference will be shareholder exit rights,
public offering regulation, and responsiveness to the uncertainty,
information asymmetry, and agency costs inherent in this important capitalraising context. Only after a period of experience with resales under the
CROWDFUND Act will we be able to judge whether the resale restrictions
under that legislation are appropriate and optimally crafted. 97
95. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
96. See supra Part II.A.
97. Hicks, supra note 7, at 471 (“[T]he validity and scope of any resale limitation must
be judged by the function it serves in furthering statutorily based regulation of that
transaction.”).
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